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Abstract
Traditionally, network-based Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDS) monitor network traffic for signs of
malicious activities. However, with the growing use of
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that encrypt network
traffic, the NIDS can no longer analyse the encrypted
data. This essentially negates any protection offered
by the NIDS. Although the encrypted traffic can be
decrypted at a network gateway for analysis, this
compromises on data confidentiality. In this paper,
we propose a detection framework which allows a
traditional NIDS to continue functioning, without com-
promising the confidentiality afforded by the VPN. Our
approach uses Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme and
randomised network proxies to enable detection of ma-
licious activities in encrypted channels. Additionally,
this approach is able to detect any malicious attempts
to forge network traffic with the intention of evading
detection. Our experiments show that the probability of
a successful evasion is low, at about 0.98% in the worst
case. We implement our approach in a prototype and
present some preliminary results. Overall, the proposed
approach is able to consistently detect intrusions and
does not introduce any additional false positives.
1. Introduction
Intrusion detection grew from the notion that com-
puter misuse can be detected by analysing audit data in
a computer system or network [1]. Computer log files,
computer settings and network traffic usually form the
structure of most audit data. Current intrusion detection
systems analyse the audit data in either anomaly-based
detection or misuse-based detection mode.
Regardless of the detection mode used, if the audit
data is encrypted, the IDS will fail. There are two
This work is supported in part by funds from (ISC)2
broad categories of IDS; the host-based IDS (HIDS)
and network-based IDS (NIDS). We focus mainly on
the effects of encrypted audit data on NIDS. This is
motivated by the growing use of end-to-end (ETE)
encrypted networks that obfuscates all network traffic
including malicious traffic between any two endpoints
in the network. Some commonly used ETE encryption
protocols are Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and various
other Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocols.
To a certain extent, this problem can be solved with
proper network design where the encrypted network is
terminated at the NIDS for analysis before sending it
along its route in decrypted form. However, this setup
is not suitable when confidentiality must be maintained
from the source right up to the destination. What is
needed is a NIDS that can integrate and function well
in ETE encrypted networks.
In this paper, we propose an approach that allows a
NIDS to operate in ETE encrypted networks and does
not compromise the network’s confidentiality or in-
tegrity. For most NIDS, such integration has never been
directly addressed. There is an implicit assumption that
unencrypted network traffic is always available and it
is up to the network administrator to ensure this.
2. Related Works
Besides modifying the network design to accommo-
date the NIDS, another is to use a man-in-the-middle
approach. This is a type of active sniffing technique
where the sniffer makes independent connections with
two communicating peers and relays messages be-
tween them, with each of the peers believing that it
is communicating directly with its counterpart.
Yamada et al. [2] noted that with the NIDS-in-the-
middle, all encrypted network traffic can be decrypted
with the private keys of both peers. One of the dif-
ficulties in using this approach is the need to have a
secure key management system.
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For these reasons, most research work have focused
on other approaches. To the best of our knowledge,
there are three known approaches to this problem.
The first approach uses statistical traffic analysis
techniques to detect intrusions. With such techniques,
network packets but not its payload, are examined to
infer information from patterns in the communication
process. Specific patterns of network occurences often
characterise an attack. Yamada et al. [2] and Piccitto
et al. [3] used this technique to identify malicious
activities in SSL and VPN traffic. This analysis is
limited in scope due to the few traffic patterns that can
actually be deduced purely by observing the network.
The second approach assumes that any attempts to
misuse ETE encryption protocols are symptoms of
attacks on an endpoint. To detect protocol misuse,
works by Md. Fadlullah et al. [4], Joglekar and Tate
[5] and Yasinsac and Childs [6] begin by defining
an accurate specification of a legitimately working
ETE encryption protocol. Any deviation from this
specification is considered as an attack. In spite of
that, the task of defining this specification is not trivial.
Every possible legitimate state within the protocol
must be modeled. Moreover, if an attack complies to
the protocol exactly, a malicious payload can still be
sent because this approach does not check the payload.
The third approach analyses the payloads of net-
work packets. Also known as deep packet inspection,
this approach is suitable for the detection traditional
attacks such as malformed URL string or SQL in-
jection attacks. The data and/or the header portion of
network packets can be quickly matched against attack
signatures, without relying on any complicated pre-
processing as the previous two approaches.
Abimbola et al. [7] installed their specialised NIDS
sensors in network endpoints where network traffic
has already been decrypted and accessible. Instead of
proposing a new detection algorithm, they feed the
decrypted network traffic into a traditional NIDS like
SNORT [8]. Although effective, it does not address the
fact that the sensor residing on the target system can
be defeated if the system is compromised.
We thus propose a framework that integrates a NIDS
into an encrypted network, which is functionally equiv-
alent to passive sniffing techniques but without the
need for public-key infrastructure (PKI) and without
compromising on confidentiality.
Although a HIDS could have been used to address
the problem of detecting ETE attacks, it has the added
overhead of being intrinsically complex. A HIDS has
to monitor many distinct aspects of the host such as
system calls and file statuses.
3. Detection Framework
3.1. Approach
A standard NIDS intercepts and analyses the net-
work traffic between communicating parties, either
using passive sniffing, or by acting as a relay in the
case of a NIDS-in-the-middle configuration.
If the traffic is ETE encrypted, passive sniffing be-
comes infeasible unless the NIDS receives all decryp-
tion keys of the communicating parties. This design
involves the use of a PKI which implies heavy key
management overhead. We propose instead a protocol,
based on a secret-sharing scheme, in which a copy of
all network traffic is explicitly forwarded to the NIDS
over standard channels. This is done while preserving
the privacy and integrity of the communication process.
Moreover, the protocol also makes it difficult for a
malicious sender to evade detection.
To achieve this, we have a Central IDS (CIDS) that
carries out traffic analysis and intrusion detection. The
CIDS operates as a separate host in the encrypted
network. We make no further assumptions about the
type of detection technique used by this CIDS.
Next, we install IDS sensors in all endpoints of
the same network [7]. An IDS sensor ensures that all
network traffic that goes to the receiver also goes to
the CIDS for analysis. Our approach is summarised by
the following principle:
All traffic sent to a receiver by a sender must be repli-
cated and forwarded also to the CIDS, without the
possibility of the sender withholding traffic from the
CIDS or forging fake traffic, and while maintaining
the confidentiality and integrity of the ETE network.
To realise this principle on an ETE encrypted net-
work, it is thus necessary to achieve three objectives:
1) Ensure that all traffic sent by the sender is
forwarded to both the receiver and CIDS, without
possibility of witholding traffic from the CIDS;
2) Prevent the sender from sending forged traffic to
the CIDS; and
3) Do not compromise the privacy afforded by the
ETE encrypted network.
To enforce these objectives, we use message for-
warding proxies shown in Fig. 1 and Shamir’s secret-
sharing threshold scheme [9]. These proxies are regular
network hosts and the protocol requires each host
implement such relaying capabilities.
If a sender wishes to send a message to the re-
ceiver, the sender will first split the message into its
corresponding shares using the secret-sharing scheme.
Briefly, a (k, n) secret-sharing scheme represents a
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Figure 1. Proposed transmission scheme (k = 2)
secret S as n shares where S = {s1, si, . . . , sn}.
Knowledge of any k or more si recovers S while
knowledge of any k − 1 or less reveals nothing.
In secret-sharing, confidentiality is thus an inherent
feature and key management is not needed.
So, if we let the message to be sent be M , its
shares are {m1,mi, . . . ,mn}. The sender will then
send one share mi to one of the proxies. Each proxy
in turn randomly chooses where to forward the share
to. Specifically, it does one of the following actions:
• Forward to receiver with probability Pr;
• Forward to CIDS with probability Pc;
• Forward to both CIDS and receiver with proba-
bility Pb; or
• Drop the message with probability Pd.
The message M is recoverable by both the receiver
and CIDS provided that they receive at least k shares
each. We can summarise the entire process as follows:
Algorithm
1) Sender splits M into {m1,mi, . . . ,mn}
2) Each mi is sent to a proxy
3) Proxy pi does one of the four predefined actions
4) Sender receives k or more mi and recovers M
5) CIDS receives k or more mi and recovers M
If we assume that in the initial state, all hosts (except
possibly a single malicious sender) follow the protocol,
the three objectives identified above are met as follows:
1) The sender cannot prevent the forwarding prox-
ies from forwarding the traffic to the CIDS;
2) The randomised behaviour of the proxies pre-
vents the sender from choosing a subset of
proxies that would allow him to send forged
traffic to the CIDS.
3) The shared secret scheme ensures that none of
the relaying proxies is able to reassemble the
message, unless k proxies (or k−1 proxies plus
the sender) conspire.
We analyse these different cases formally in
Sect. 3.3. Note that encryption could have been used to
encrypt M prior to sending instead of using the secret-
sharing scheme, but that would require every endpoint
possess the decryption keys of every other endpoints,
with all the implied complexity of key management.
3.2. Detection Process
Consider now the case of a sophisticated attacker. In
an attempt to evade detection, the attacker sends two
different messages; M to the target while M ′ is for the
CIDS. This is done with the intention of misleading the
CIDS with forged and incorrect traffic. Hence, if the
CIDS can detect the presence of two distinct messages,
it can detect an evasion attempt.
For the sake of clarity, let M be malicious message
to the receiver and M ′ be forged but harmless message
to the CIDS. Each of them is represented as M =
{m1,mi, . . . ,mα} and M ′ = {m′1,m′j , . . . ,m′β}
where α + β ≤ n and α, β ≥ k for a (k, n) secret-
sharing scheme.
Since the actions of the proxies are a-priori unpre-
dictable, the attacker will not know beforehand which
of the n proxies will forward to whom (CIDS, receiver
or both). It is therefore impossible for the attacker to
reliably select which proxies should receive shares of
M and which should receive shares of M ′. This is true
if we assume that all the proxies are uncompromised
and not collaborating with the attacker.
With this uncertainty, the receiver may receive k or
more shares that resolve to one of the following three
cases.
1) Receives only mi shares and recovers M ;
2) Receives m′j shares and recovers M ′; or
3) Receives a mixture of both mi shares and m′j
shares. We call this case as corrupted and label
it as C.
Referring to cases above, an evasion is successful if
the CIDS receives M ′ (harmless message). However,
if C is received, the receiver or CIDS knows that there
has been an attempt to forge a fake message. The ef-
fects of receiving M (malicious message) are different
for the receiver and CIDS. While M compromises the
receiver, the CIDS will identify M as malicious by its
detection engine.
Consistent with our assumption, we say that an
attack is successful if and only if the CIDS receives
M ′ (harmless message) and the receiver receives M
(malicious message). This is reflected in Table 1.
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Table 1. Truth table of detection outcomes where
a True Positive (TP) is detection by CIDS and a
False Negative (FN) is a successful attack
Receiver
CIDS M M ′ C
M TP TP TP
M ′ FN TN TP
C TP TP TP
As shown in Table 1, whenever the receiver or CIDS
receives C, it is immediately known that there has
been an attempt to evade detection. Notice that in our
approach, there are no false positives outcomes. This
detection method does not introduce any additional
false positives on top of the false positives caused by
the CIDS, which relies on traditional IDS.
There are actually two classes of true positives that
can be detected by the approach. They are as follows,
• Remote attack. This type of attacks can generally
be detected by IDS like SNORT. In any case,
these attacks pose a traditional intrusion detec-
tion problem. This can be detected if the CIDS
received M ; and
• Evasions. Attacks that attempt to evade CIDS
detection in our context, by trying to forge false
reports to the CIDS. This can be detected if either
the CIDS or receiver receives C.
When both the receiver and CIDS receive the forged
but harmless message M ′, a true negative outcome
is observed. A true negative (TN) outcome does not
negatively affect the receiver or CIDS.
Notice also that in Table 1, there is only one false
negative or successful attack outcome. We will analyse
the probability of this occurrence below.
3.3. Analysis
Each proxy carries out a specific action with a
certain probability as stated earlier in Sect. 3.1. The
probabilities Pr, Pc, Pb and Pd are the same for all
proxies and Pr + Pc + Pb + Pd = 1.
Consider α malicious shares given as
{m1,mi, . . . ,mα} that are exclusively meant for
the receiver. The probability of the receiver receiving
x shares of mi only, where 0 ≤ x ≤ α is,
P (x) = αCx (Pr)x (Pd)α−x (1)
The notation σCϕ is the binomial coefficient
(
σ
ϕ
)
.
Eq. (1) considers the fact that mi should not be sent
to the CIDS to prevent mixtures from occurring at
the CIDS. Similarly, Eq. (2) follows from Eq. (1)
for β harmless shares of {m′1,m′j , . . . ,m′β} where
0 ≤ y ≤ β.
P (y) = βCy (Pc)y (Pd)β−y (2)
With secret-sharing, the minimum number of shares
required to recover M and M ′ is k. Furthermore,
if an attack is to be successful, the receiver must
only receive mi while the CIDS must only receive
m′j . Hence, the overall probability of getting a false
negative (FN) outcome (successful attack) is,
P (FN) =
α∑
x=k
β∑
y=k
P (x) · P (y) (3)
In contrast, there are two classes of true positives
which are the remote attacks and evasions. To de-
termine their probabilities, we begin by defining the
probability of the CIDS receiving u shares of mi,
P (u) = αCu (Pb + Pc)u (Pd + Pr)α−u (4)
where 0 ≤ u ≤ α. Likewise, the probability of the
CIDS receiving v shares of m′j where 0 ≤ v ≤ β is,
P (v) = βCv (Pb + Pc)v (Pd + Pr)β−v (5)
The joint probability of the CIDS receiving only u
shares of mi and v shares of m′j is thus given as,
P (u, v) = P (u) · P (v) (6)
We know that a remote attack is detected if the
CIDS receives only malicious shares and none of the
harmless shares. This results in the CIDS getting M .
Since k is minimum number of shares required to
recover M from mi, we get
P (Remote attacks) =
α∑
u=k
P (u, v = 0) (7)
Evasions are detected if the CIDS receives a mixture
of mi and m′j . Consequently, the probability of the
CIDS detecting evasions is given as,
P (Evasions) =
k−1∑
u=1
β∑
v=k−u
P (u, v) +
α∑
u=k
β∑
v=1
P (u, v)
(8)
Summing Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), the total probability of
a true positive outcome (successful detection) on the
CIDS is,
P (TP) = P (Remote attacks) + P (Evasions) (9)
From Sect. 3.1, we have the conditions α + β ≤
n and α, β ≥ k. If the attacker uses the minimum
number of shares for both α and β which is k, the
total number of shares is 2k. Evasion thus becomes
strictly impossible if 2k ≥ n.
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4. Evaluation
A prototype that implements the proposed approach
has been developed for a Linux operating system. An
IPsec-based VPN with 12 endpoints and one CIDS
running a standard SNORT installation is used as the
experimental network in our tests. From the discus-
sions presented in Sect. 3, we can reasonably expect
the proposed approach to have the following operating
properties.
• It complements and works with a standard NIDS;
• There should not be any negative impact on the
detection ability of the NIDS; and
• It makes the task of evading detection very diffi-
cult if not impossible.
We begin our evaluation by verifying that the pro-
posed approach does not introduce any additional false
positives. We apply a dataset of synthetic traffic against
SNORT in a network with and without our implemen-
tation. The dataset consists of both malicious and non-
malicious traffic for a range of network protocols like
HTTP, ICMP and FTP. Throughout the experiment,
we observe no differences in the number of SNORT
alerts when our implementation is in use, compared to
a network without it. This experiment is not an IDS
evaluation and therefore we make no further attempts
to ensure its completeness.
4.1. Experiment and Results
We proceed to apply our proposed approach which
is configured to use a (n = 10, k = 3) secret-sharing
scheme in the same network setup.
We assume the presence of a sophisticated attacker
where the attacker attempts to evade CIDS detection
by forging harmless network traffic. Harmless network
traffic such as a “GET /index.html HTTP/1.1”
request is forged to be sent to the CIDS, while mali-
cious traffic such as “GET /x90x90x90. . .” is sent
to the receiver. The sequence of x90 (NOOP sledge) is
often symptomatic of buffer overflow-based shellcode
attacks. Accordingly, most misuse-based IDS use x90
as a detection signature.
For this test, a mixture of shares (resulting in C)
is obtained at both the receiver and CIDS. This out-
come is considered as a positive detection. The test is
repeated numerous time and all evasion attempts are
consistently detected. In fact, the probability of suc-
cessfully evading detection is small and is expressed
as Eq. (3). We also separately verified Eq. (3) by
simulating attacks. Fig. 2 presents a plot of Eq. (3)
and the simulated results for varying values of k. We
set Pr = 26 , Pc =
2
6 , Pb =
1
6 and Pd =
1
6 .
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Figure 3. Throughput when k shares are required
by receiver and CIDS for n = 10
Theoretically, any value of k between 2 ≤ k ≤ n can
be used. As Fig. 2 shows, there is a downward trend in
an attacker’s ability to evade detection as larger values
of k are used. While k ≤ n2 , there exist a chance
for an attacker to evade detection. However, at the
cutoff value of k > n2 , an attacker’s chance of evading
detection is completely eliminated.
While using a larger k may seem like a good idea,
it comes with a cost of increased network latency.
Latency depends on k because a receiving party must
have received at least k shares before the message can
be recovered. Due to the unpredictable and indepen-
dent nature of the proxies, there exist situations when
less than k shares are forwarded to the receiving party.
Fig. 3 shows the throughput (kbits/sec) of our pro-
totype. The dashed line is obtained when the proxies
are randomly forwarding or dropping network packets.
Latency increases with increasing values of k and we
thus see a drop in the throughput. As a baseline for
comparison, we also plot the throughput when all n
proxies are set to forward their packets to both the
receiver and CIDS (solid line). The average drop in
throughput is calculated to be about 40%.
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4.2. Discussions
One concern in using the proposed approach is the
implied network overhead. If a sender sends t packets
of data to a receiver with our proposed approach, the
total network overhead is calculated and observed to be
2tn packets. Taking this into consideration, we believe
that the approach is more suitable when used in a more
selective manner. For instance, some traffic intensive
applications like media and voice streaming can be
deemed safe and do not require our approach.
Our approach thus far does not consider cases of
multi-node conspiracy. A conspiracy in our context is
a scenario where an attacker collaborates with already
compromised proxies to further propagate its malicious
activities without being detected by the CIDS. Rather
than being unpredictable to the attacker, a conspiring
proxy can actually dictate which share (malicious or
harmless) be forwarded to whom (CIDS or receiver).
4.2.1. Other applications. Although the motivation
for our work has mainly been the need for an effective
technique to monitor ETE networks, we believe that
it can be adapted for applications where nodes in a
multi-node network cannot be trusted.
Such is the case with mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs). A MANET is formed when a group of
mobile nodes cooperatively communicate with each
other without a pre-established infrastructure. Accord-
ing to Tseng et al. [10], a MANET is inherently trust-
all-peers by design and therein lies its problem. A
malicious node can corrupt other trusting nodes by
forging incorrect data packets to evade detection. This
problem bears similarities with our work, specifically
the fact that not all nodes can be fully trusted.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a principle that allows
a CIDS to analyse network traffic even when end-
to-end encryption is used. This principle ensures that
all network traffic are forwarded to both the CIDS
as well as the intended receiver. The implementation
of the principle is able to ensure that network traffic
arrives at both the CIDS and receiver. It is also able to
detect attempts to evade detection by forging network
traffic. This is achieved without compromising the
confidentiality of the transmissions.
We have demonstrated through the experiment and
simulations that our approach has been able to consis-
tently detect two types of attacks, specifically remote
attacks and evasions. In particular, our approach makes
it difficult for an attacker to successfully evade detec-
tion. The results have so far been promising, especially
the fact that the approach does not cause additional
false positives. We have also identified a number of
limitations and are currently working to address them.
Traditional NIDS methodologies will no longer be
feasible in fully encrypted network infrastructure and
will have to be adapted. We believe that our approach
is one step in that direction.
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